Thursday, October 3, 2013

HUME PHILOSOPHY

Desmond Hume was also a name clue. Many people thought Desmond's character may be a reference to English philosopher David Hume (1711-1776).

Hume's position in ethics, which is based on his empiricist theory of the mind, is best known for asserting four theses: (1) Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the “slave of the passions”  (2) Moral distinctions are not derived from reason (3) Moral distinctions are derived from the moral sentiments: feelings of approval (esteem, praise) and disapproval (blame) felt by spectators who contemplate a character trait or action  (4) While some virtues and vices are natural  others, including justice, are artificial. There is a great debate about what Hume actually meant by these positions. He defends them within the broader context of his metaethics and his ethic of virtue and vice.

Hume worked on the issues of  ethics and political philosophy.

One is a question of moral epistemology: how do human beings become aware of, or acquire knowledge or belief about, moral good and evil, right and wrong, duty and obligation? Ethical theorists and theologians of the day held, variously, that moral good and evil are discovered: (a) by reason in some of its uses (Hobbes, Locke, Clarke), (b) by divine revelation (Filmer), (c) by conscience or reflection on one's (other) impulses (Butler), or (d) by a moral sense: an emotional responsiveness manifesting itself in approval or disapproval (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson). Hume sides with the moral sense theorists: we gain awareness of moral good and evil by experiencing the pleasure of approval and the uneasiness of disapproval when we contemplate a character trait or action from an imaginatively sensitive and unbiased point of view. Hume maintains against the rationalists that, although reason is needed to discover the facts of any concrete situation and the general social impact of a trait of character or a practice over time, reason alone is insufficient to yield a judgment that something is virtuous or vicious. In the last analysis, the facts as known must trigger a response by sentiment or “taste.”

A related but more metaphysical controversy would be stated thus today: what is the source or foundation of moral norms? In Hume's day this is the question what is the ground of moral obligation (as distinct from what is the faculty for acquiring moral knowledge or belief). Moral rationalists of the period such as Clarke (and in some moods, Hobbes and Locke) argue that moral standards or principles are requirements of reason — that is, that the very rationality of right actions is the ground of our obligation to perform them. Divine voluntarists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries such as Samuel Pufendorf claim that moral obligation or requirement, if not every sort of moral standard, is the product of God's will. The moral sense theorists (Shaftesbury and Hutcheson) and Butler see all requirements to pursue goodness and avoid evil as consequent upon human nature, which is so structured that a particular feature of our consciousness (whether moral sense or conscience) evaluates the rest. Hume sides with the moral sense theorists on this question: it is because we are the kinds of creatures we are, with the dispositions we have for pain and pleasure, the kinds of familial and friendly interdependence that make up our life together, and our approvals and disapprovals of these, that we are bound by moral requirements at all.

Hume represents the following points:
1. A person's free will is not controlled by reason but one's passions.
2. Reason does not set morality.
3. Morality is determined by feelings of approval or disapproval felt by others to one's actions.
4. Virtues, vices, ethics and justice are artificial concepts in a natural world.
5. A person gains awareness of moral good and evil by experiencing the pleasure of approval and the uneasiness of disapproval from a character trait or action formed from family and friend interdependence bind everyone to a moral requirement.

In LOST, Desmond is a literal and figurative drifter. He drifts from job to job, career to religious order. He gets involved with women for pleasure, but runs away from the moral commitment of marriage. He seems to have a chip on his shoulder, that his poor station in life is just as good as the rich and powerful elite. But in order to prove that point, he must build up his own character by completing something great (like the solo boat race).

Desmond is also a contradiction. He is deeply in love with Penny, but in order to cement that bond, he must leave her for a suicidal boat race to impress her father. Many people would call that illogical - - - nuts. His moral compass is completely off. His decision making is formed by passion and not reason or sound judgment.  Despite Penny's disapproval and anger, Desmond turns his back on any traditional moral ground to stay with Penny.

Once on the island, Desmond's life has no ethical or moral bearing. He has no free will. He classifies himself as a prisoner in a snow globe. He is filled with self-remorse, guilt, and delusion. He had lost Penny. But in all his decisions up to the island shipwreck, subconsciously, that is what Desmond wanted: his fate was not have any happiness with Penny or any other woman. His character was to be a dour nobody.

So Desmond's character really had nothing in common with David Hume's positions. Desmond was not the moral barometer for the show.

The side story of Desmond and Penny was not critical to the show's ending. Yes, Desmond became the livery driver to "awaken" the island survivors to their island memories - - - which in itself is an illogical construct - - -  but that job could have been done by Charlie, who started to think outside the box before the concert, or even Libby getting Hurley to remember. Desmond was not associated or close to any of the sideways characters. His final position in the church reunion with Penny is another one of those odd inconsistencies in the ending.